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GROTHEER v. ESCAPE ADVENTURES, INC.

“Then suddenly the wind changed, and the balloon floated down into the
heart of this noble city, where I was instantly acclaimed Oz, the First
Wizard de Luxe!”
– The Wizard1
Though many first impressions of hot air balloons likely arise from the iconic
finale of The Wizard of Oz, 2 the world’s first encounter with ballooning occurred
over two centuries ago in Versailles, France.3 In 1783, two brothers designed a model
under the supervision of King Louis XVI for three inaugural passengers: a sheep, a
duck, and a rooster.4 Hot air balloons were the precursor to modern aviation5 and are
still enjoyed by many for sightseeing and sport.6
In Grotheer v. Escape Adventures, Inc., passenger Erika Grotheer (“Grotheer”)
experienced the wonder of ballooning on a tour at a California vineyard—but her
adventure did not end with a magical trip back to Kansas.7 What started out for
Grotheer as a typical hot air balloon tour with Grape Escape (“Escape”) turned into
an unplanned sideways descent, collision with a fence, and a fractured leg from a
harsh landing.8
When Grotheer sued for her injury, the California Court of Appeal was required
to decide, as a matter of first impression, whether a hot air balloon operator was a
common carrier.9 Passenger vehicles such as bumper cars, stagecoaches, roller
coasters, ski lifts, and airplane tours are all common carriers under California law.10
Common carrier status subjects the operators of those vehicles to a heightened duty
of care.11 Accordingly, operators designated as common carriers cannot use the
1.

Noel Langley et al., Wizard of Oz, The (1939), Screenplays for You, https://sfy.ru/script/wizard_of_
oz_1939 (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).

2.

Jimmy Stamp, Hot Air Balloon Travel for the Luxury Traveler of the 1800s, Smithsonian Mag. (Mar. 5,
2013), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/hot-air-balloon-travel-for-the-luxury-travelerof-the-1800s-496002/.

3.

Ernie Tretkoff, November 783: Intrepid Physicist is First to Fly, 15 APS News 2, 2 (2006).

4.

Id.

5.

See Balloon Flying Handbook, Fed. Aviation Admin. 2-1 (2008), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_
policies/handbooks_manuals/aircraft/media/faa-h-8083-11.pdf (explaining that hot air balloons are the
oldest human flight technology).

6.

See Stamp, supra note 2 (discussing the modern recreational uses of hot air balloons).

7.

See 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); Wizard of Oz, Kansas Historical Soc’y:
Kansapedia (Apr. 2013), https://www.kshs.org/kansapedia/wizard-of-oz/12240.

8.

Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 635–36.

9.

Id. at 635, 639. Under California Civil Code Section 2168, “a common carrier of persons is anyone ‘who
offers to the public to carry persons.’” Cal. Civ. Code § 2168 (Deering, 2018). This Case Comment
discusses common carriers solely in the context of the California Civil Code and will not analyze the
definition of common carriers under the Public Utilities Code, which is a separate legal issue. See
William Lindsley et al., § 15. Common Carriers Under Public Utilities Code—Persons
and Corporations Excluded, in 11A Cal. Jur. 3d Carriers § 15 (2019).

10.

Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 640 (citing Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 44–48 (Cal. 2005)).

11.

Gomez, 113 P.3d at 43.
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primary assumption of risk doctrine as a defense to negligence claims.12 Ultimately,
the court concluded that hot air balloon operators are not common carriers, finding
that Escape could rely on a primary assumption of risk defense to Grotheer’s
negligence claims.13 The court refused to apply a heightened duty of care to hot air
ballooning, an activity that the court reasoned contains inherent risks like wind
turbulence and collisions.14
This Case Comment contends that the Grotheer court erred on two grounds
when it held that a hot air balloon operator is not a common carrier. First, the court
ignored California precedent that would have demonstrated such operators are
certainly common carriers.15 Second, the court should have placed more emphasis on
Gomez v. Superior Court 16 in reaching its decision, because Grotheer’s case is
analogous to cases involving confined amusement attractions17 rather than
participatory activities.18 The Grotheer court has not only denied the possibility of
relief for future injured plaintiffs,19 but it has also limited the scope of California’s
common carrier doctrine, which has consistently been applied to cover a broad variety
of activities, vehicles, and modes of transportation. 20 This decision creates a
12.

Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 639–40. Under California law, a “carrier for persons without reward must
use ordinary care and diligence for their safe carriage.” Id. at 640 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 2096). On
the other hand, a carrier who carries goods or passengers for reward, or compensation, “must use the
utmost care and diligence” when transporting its passengers. Id. (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 2100). This
standard is considered a “heightened duty of care” and “precludes the application of the primary
assumption of risk doctrine.” Id. at 639–40. Primary assumption of risk can be invoked when the
defendant does not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff and thus cannot be held negligent in his conduct
because the plaintiff understood the risk created by that defendant’s actions but proceeded with the
activity anyways. Scott Giesler, Comment, The Uncertain Future of Assumption of Risk in California, 28
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1495, 1501–02 (1995).

13.

Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 639.

14.

Id. at 641.

15.

Treadwell v. Whittier, 22 P. 266, 270 (Cal. 1889); McDaniel v. Dowell, 26 Cal. Rptr. 140, 143 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1962); McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, 23 Cal. Rptr. 339, 340–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962).

16.

113 P.3d 41 (Cal. 2005).

17.

See id. at 48 (discussing how common carrier analysis applies to entertainment activities such as amusement
park attractions).

18.

See Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1166 (Cal. 2012) (outlining how a bumper car operator
was not a common carrier due to the participatory nature of the activity); Swigart v. Bruno, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 556, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (discussing how a horseback riding operator was not a common
carrier due to the participatory nature of the activity); Griffin v. Haunted Hotel, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d
830, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (detailing how a haunted house operator was not a common carrier due
to the participatory nature of the activity).

19.

As a defense, the primary assumption of risk doctrine completely eliminates the possibility of recovery
in negligence cases. 1 Cal. Torts § 4.03, at 2(b)(ii) (2019).

20. Gomez, 113 P.3d at 44; see also Mark A. Franklin, California’s Extension of Common Carrier Liability to

Roller Coasters and Similar Devices: An Examination of Gomez v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 24 W. St.
U. L. Rev. 29, 37 (2006) (explaining that the Gomez decision expanded the definition of “carrier of
persons for reward” to vehicles that are not considered “traditional transportation devices,” such as roller
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challenging standard for future common carrier cases and ignores relevant legal
precedent that should serve as a guide in deciding this issue.21
Grotheer’s adventure began when her son, Thorsten, purchased her a ticket for
an Escape hot air balloon tour while visiting California as a present for her seventyeighth birthday.22 Grotheer was “a non-English speaking German citizen,”23 so when
Thorsten brought Grotheer to Escape’s meeting location at a winery, he tried to
inform the staff of his mother’s language barrier so that they make sure she
understood the safety instructions.24 The staff informed Thorsten that he could not
be in the launch area without a ticket, and at some point during the check-in period,
Grotheer signed Escape’s liability waiver, which released the company from claims
based on “ordinary negligence.”25 Grotheer and Thorsten then traveled together to
the launch location in Thorsten’s vehicle. 26 Grotheer never received any safety
instructions before lift-off, despite having contact with Escape staff members both
before and after the ride to the launch location.27
Grotheer’s hot air balloon tour proceeded without incident until it came time for
the landing. 28 As the balloon descended, it increased in speed, floated sideways,
crashed into a fence, and made a hard impact with the ground before skidding almost
forty yards.29 Grotheer recalled holding on to a metal rod when the balloon basket hit
the fence and feeling her leg break during the subsequent impact with the ground.30
When the balloon finally stopped, the basket rested on its side and not its bottom.31
coasters); Stephen M. Sullivan, Note, Of Thrill Rides and Bar Fights: Gomez v. Superior Court, Delgado v.
Trax Bar & Grill, and the Expanding Duty of Care in California, 36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 59, 63 (2007).
21.

See, e.g., Treadwell v. Whittier, 22 P. 266, 270 (Cal. 1889); McDaniel v. Dowell, 26 Cal. Rptr. 140, 143
(Cal. Ct. App. 1962); McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, 23 Cal. Rptr. 339, 340–41 (Cal. Ct. App.
1962).

22.

Grotheer v. Escape Adventures, Inc., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).

23.

Id.

24.

Id. at 635–36. Thorsten tried to explain his mother’s language barrier but the pilot “responded by
waving him away and saying, ‘Everything is going to be fine.’” Id. He also tried informing two other
Escape employees, but “they appeared to be in a rush and told him he could not be in the immediate
launch vicinity if he had not purchased a ticket.” Id. at 636.

25.

Id. at 636. Grotheer still signed the liability waiver despite being unable to understand any of its terms.
Respondents’ Brief at 34–35, Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633 (No. E063449). As this was Grotheer’s
first experience on a hot air balloon, one of her son’s concerns was her inability to speak or read English.
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 7, Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633 (No. E063449).

26. Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636.
27.

Appellant’s Reply Brief at 14–15, Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633 (No. E063449); Grotheer, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 644. Peter Gallagher, Escape’s balloon pilot, drove the other passengers to the launch
location separately, but those passengers also claimed that he did not provide any safety instructions
prior to the flight. Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636.

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 637.
31.

Id. at 636.
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Grotheer sued Escape, Gallagher,32 and Wilson Creek Vineyards in the Superior
Court of Riverside County.33 She sued Escape and Gallagher for negligent or reckless
operation of the balloon in failing to “properly slow its descent during landing” and
provide “safe landing instructions.”34 Grotheer argued that as an operator, Escape
was a common carrier and therefore “owed its passengers a heightened duty of care.”35
During the presentation of evidence in the case, Gallagher contended that the crash
occurred due to a false lift, 36 which requires additional heat to keep the balloon
afloat.37 Grotheer’s expert in the case, James Kitchel—a balloon pilot of over twentyfive years—disagreed. 38 Providing his expert opinion, Kitchel explained that the
balloon likely experienced a wind shear.39 Kitchel elaborated that Gallagher could
have “avoided the crash entirely” by adding more heat to safely control the balloon’s
descent.40 Kitchel described ballooning as a potentially “violent, high speed [event]
with tragic results” because a pilot only has control over the balloon’s altitude and is
thus “at the mercy of the wind speed.”41 Furthermore, Kitchel criticized Escape’s
failure to provide pre-flight instructions, noting that commercial hot air balloon

32.

Gallagher was both an agent of Escape Adventures, Inc. and the pilot who was operating the balloon
when it made a crash landing and injured Grotheer. Id. at 635.

33.

Id.

34. Id. Grotheer alleged that Wilson Creek, the vineyard site during the tour, was vicariously liable for

Escape and Gallagher’s negligence because their business affiliations created a special relationship with
the company. Id. Vicarious liability is the imposition of liability on one person for the actionable conduct
of another, based solely on the relationship between the two persons. Vicarious Liability, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

35.

Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 635. Specifically, Grotheer claimed that Escape was a “common carrier
for reward,” as defined in California Civil Code § 2100, which states that “[a] carrier of persons for
reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary
for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.” Id. at 639 (quoting Cal.
Civ. Code § 2100 (Deering 2018)).

36. Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 637. A false lift may occur during the initial takeoff and acceleration when

the balloon blocks the natural wind and creates a change in wind speed, bringing the balloon into the
air. Robert L. Ruppenthal, Balloon Safety Tips, Fed. Aviation Admin. 1, https://www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/media/balloon_safety_tips.pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2020). This creates a false lift that will abruptly cease after takeoff and therefore requires the pilot to
constantly add heat until the balloon ascends properly. Id. This occurred during Gallagher’s descent
when the air speed suddenly dropped. While this initially created a “false lift effect,” the balloon
continued to descend and lost that momentum, making the balloon descend “more quickly than
anticipated.” Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636.

37.

Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 637.

38. Id.
39.

Id. A wind shear occurs when a balloon is airborne, and the wind unexpectedly increases in speed. The
gust can distort the vertical axis of the balloon, cause severe turbulence, and alter the balloon’s path of
descent and landing location if it is not properly managed by the pilot. Ruppenthal, supra note 36, at 2.

40. Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 637.
41.

Id.
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operators must provide such safety instructions in accordance with industry
standards.42
In response, the defendants moved for summary judgment on two issues.43 They
asserted that Grotheer assumed the risk of injury under the primary implied
assumption of risk doctrine44 and that Grotheer signed a liability waiver relieving
them of responsibility.45 The trial court conducted a hearing and concluded that
“Grotheer assumed the risk of injury by voluntarily riding in the balloon, and [the]
defendants owed no duty whatsoever to protect her.”46 The court initially denied the
defendants’ motion of summary judgment on the liability waiver issue but ultimately
granted the motion, reasoning that Escape and Gallagher did not owe Grotheer any
duty of care.47 Grotheer appealed to the California Court of Appeal and argued that
the trial court’s granting of the motion was improper because “it failed to consider
whether the ‘heightened duty’ standards, imposed on a ‘common carrier,’ materially
[affected] the application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine.”48
In the late seventeenth century England, negligence arose as a legal claim when
plaintiffs accused defendants of failing to take appropriate care when performing a task
or duty.49 English courts began to apply the concept of “duty” to common carriers in

42.

Id. Kitchel also referenced the Federal Aviation Administration’s Balloon Flying Handbook, which
states that pre-flight safety instructions must be given, and provides suggestions on how to properly
conduct these “passenger briefings” to “explain correct posture and procedure to passengers.” Grotheer,
222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 337; Balloon Flying Handbook, supra note 5, at 6–12.

43.

Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 638. A defendant brings a motion for summary judgment to assert that
“one or more elements of [the plaintiff ’s] cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a
complete defense to to that cause of action.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(a), (p)(2) (West 2017). The
court will “[grant] summary judgment when there are no triable issues of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. § 437c(c).

44. Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 639.
45.

Id. at 638. Grotheer argued that the liability waiver was invalid because she could not speak or
understand English, the primary assumption of risk doctrine does not apply to common carriers, and
that Escape still had a duty to provide both a safe landing and safety instructions. Id. Grotheer also
alleged that because the defendants were in a “symbiotic business relationship,” Wilson Creek was
vicariously liable for Escape’s conduct. Id.

46. Id. The trial court also found that “Wilson Creek was not vicariously liable for Escape and Gallagher’s

conduct,” but there was a genuine dispute on the enforceability of the liability waiver. Id. This Case
Comment does not discuss the issues pertaining to Wilson Creek or the liability waiver.

47.

Id.

48. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 27, at 2.
49. James C. Plunkett, The Historical Foundations of the Duty of Care, 41 Monash U. L. Rev. 716, 717–18

(2015). Negligence is defined as “the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent
person would have exercised in a similar situation.” Negligence, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019). To succeed in a negligence action, the plaintiff must first establish that the defendant owed him
or her a duty of care. Id.
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the 1800s.50 Unlike the use of ordinary care that was required in negligence suits,51
common carriers—or “carriers of goods for reward”—were held to a heightened duty of
care, making them entirely responsible for any loss of, or damage to, the goods that
they transported.52 The first “expression” of this heightened duty in American law was
seen in the 1839 Supreme Court decision of Stokes v. Saltonstall,53 which required a
coach driver to act “with reasonable skill, and with the utmost prudence and caution.”54
In 1859, the Supreme Court of California applied common carrier status to
stagecoaches, reasoning that drivers are required to provide safe transportation to
their passengers.55 Section 2168 of the California Civil Code defines a common
carrier as someone “who offers to the public to carry persons, property, or messages.”56
Carriers providing services without charge are only held to an ordinary standard of
care,57 but under Section 2100 of the California Civil Code, “[a] carrier of persons for
reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide
everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable
degree of skill.”58 Courts have since expanded common carrier status to include
operators of vehicles such as airplanes, elevators, and ski lifts.59
Holding common carriers to a higher duty of care is legally significant because it
bars the defendant carrier from using the primary assumption of risk doctrine as a
defense in negligence suits.60 The primary assumption of risk defense to negligence
claims may be raised in cases where the defendant never owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff in the first place, under the rationale that the plaintiff knowingly acted in the
50. Plunkett, supra note 49, at 722.
51.

See id. at 732 (illustrating that ordinary care refers to the amount of reasonable care a defendant would
take to avoid danger and harm to another, given the circumstances of each situation).

52.

Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 43 (Cal. 2005).

53.

38 U.S. 181 (1839).

54. Id. at 193.
55.

Fairchild v. Cal. Stage Co., 13 Cal. 599, 602 (Cal. 1859) (“It is true that proprietors of stagecoaches are
common carriers, and that common carriers are insurers or warrantors . . . of the goods they undertake
to carry.”).

56. Cal. Civ. Code § 2168 (Deering 2018).
57.

Id. § 2096 (“A carrier of persons without reward must use ordinary care and diligence for their safe
carriage.”); Franklin, supra note 20, at 35 (quoting Hall v. Conn. River S. B. Co., 13 Conn. 319, 326
(1839) (“The reason for this lower duty is that a carrier of goods has absolute control over its cargo,
whereas a passenger is capable of contributing to the harm, making the determination of liability more
difficult.”)).

58. Cal. Civ. Code § 2100.
59.

See Smith v. O’Donnell, 12 P.2d 933, 935 (Cal. 1932) (holding that a f light operator transporting
customers between the ocean and an airport by plane “should be held to the same degree of responsibility
. . . as a common carrier”); Treadwell v. Whittier, 22 P. 266, 269 (Cal. 1889) (finding that an elevator
operator was a common carrier); Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 900
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that a ski resort’s chair lift facility was a common carrier under California
Civil Code Section 2168).

60. Grotheer v. Escape Adventures, Inc., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
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face of an obvious risk.61 This doctrine is often used in claims arising from recreational
contexts, because imposing a duty of care on all defendant operators or organizers—
rather than recognizing the plaintiff ’s cognizant undertaking of risks involved in such
activities—could lead to “chilling vigorous participation in or sponsorship” of those
activities.62 For example, baseball stadium operators are not currently held responsible
for injuries caused by foul balls that fly beyond the stadium’s designated safety nets.63
It would be unreasonable for spectators to assume—given the size of the stadium and
the relatively limited nature of the safety netting around a typical baseball diamond—
that they are completely safeguarded from that risk.64 Furthermore, by holding
common carriers that provide transportation to a higher duty of care, California
courts have ensured that passengers will not be legally barred from seeking recovery
for harm that the carrier was fully expected to prevent.65
While these legal foundations are still relevant, the Supreme Court of California
recently decided two common carrier cases illustrating evolution within the law.66 In
2005, the court in Gomez held that a roller coaster operator is a common carrier.67
The court reasoned that although the ride’s purpose was to provide entertainment
rather than transportation, roller coasters “are operated for profit . . . and in the
expectation that thousands of patrons . . . will occupy” them, subjecting the operators
to the heightened duty of care.68 Seven years later, in Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., the
court held that a bumper car operator was not a common carrier.69 The Nalwa court
reasoned that bumper car operators should not be held to a heightened duty of care
because, unlike roller coaster passengers, bumper car drivers exercise independent
61.

Giesler, supra note 12, at 1502.

62. See Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P. 3d 1158, 1163 (Cal. 2012); Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 642

(explaining the policy behind the primary assumption of risk doctrine).

63. Sarah Farrell, Sports Leagues Taking Steps to Further Protect Fans from Balls, Bats and Pucks, Cronkite

News (Aug. 26, 2019), https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2019/08/26/sports-fan-safety-protective-nets/.

64. See Giesler, supra note 12, at 1501–02 (explaining that event center owners do not have a duty to protect

spectators from every errant ball as long as they provide screenings for those seated behind goals or
home plates).

65.

See G. Todd Withy, Effect of Comparative Negligence Principles on Defense of Assumption of the Risk, 1 Cal.
Torts § 4.03(2)(b)(ii) (2019).

66. See generally Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 640 (explaining the historical trend towards a broad

interpretation of the statute but then illustrating competing decisions in which the Supreme Court of
California found roller coasters were common carriers).

67.

Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 51 (Cal. 2005).

68. Id. at 48. In Gomez, a patron suffered a severe brain injury leading to death after riding the Indiana

Jones attraction at Disneyland. Id. at 42. It should also be noted that this holding is dissimilar from
finding that an entire amusement park is a common carrier, as the California Court of Appeal has held
that Disneyland, as an entity, is not a common carrier. Simon v. Walt Disney World Co., 8 Cal. Rptr.
3d 459, 460–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).

69. 290 P.3d 1158, 1160 (Cal. 2012). In Nalwa, the plaintiff took her children to Great America amusement

park, owned by Cedar Fair, and fractured her wrist on a bumper car’s steering wheel when her car was
bumped on both sides. Id.
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control over the steering of the car and expose themselves to “the risks inherent in
bumping.”70 The Nalwa court did not preclude the possibility that different types of
amusement ride operators could still be common carriers for reward in the future.71
However, going forward, the primary assumption of risk doctrine would apply to
both sports and “recreational activities,” such as rides, that “[involve] inherent risk of
injury to voluntary participants . . . where the risk cannot be eliminated without
altering the fundamental nature of the activity.” 72 The Grotheer court was therefore
faced with an issue of first impression73 that would determine whether California
would continue with the broad reading of the common carrier statutes, or begin to
shield defendant operators from liability in light of Nalwa’s decision.74
In its review of Grotheer’s case, the California Court of Appeal analyzed the
common carrier issue first because, if Escape was a common carrier as matter of law, it
would be held to the heightened duty of care “that precludes the application of the
primary assumption of risk doctrine.”75 The defendants argued that Grotheer’s entire
negligence claim failed because she assumed the risk of injury.76 Grotheer argued that:
(1) the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply to common carriers, (2) Escape
was not relieved from providing safe landing and emergency instructions, and (3) the
liability waiver was invalid because Grotheer did not understand it.77 On the common
carrier issue, Grotheer specifically contended that the trial court erred when it failed to
70. Id. at 1166.
71.

Id. at 1152, 1166.

72. Id. at 1160–63 (quoting Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC, 96 Cal Rptr. 3d 105, 109 (Cal. Ct. App.

2009)). Before Nalwa, California courts often applied the primary assumption of risk doctrine to
activities involving sports and similar situations where the other participants had a duty to not increase
the risk of injury inherent in the activity. Nalwa, 290 P.3d at 1162. Nalwa acts as an extension of Knight
v. Jewett, which also discussed “inherent risk” and an operator’s duty of care. 834 P.3d 696, 708–12
(Cal. 1992). The Nalwa court further emphasized that this doctrine includes recreational activities. See
Nalwa, 290 P.3d at 1162–64 (finding that the policy behind primary assumption of risk applies to
injuries from physical recreation and not to activities of daily life because otherwise there would be a
potential chilling effect on recreational activity through the overapplication of tort liability for ordinary
negligence connected to such recreational activities).

73. Grotheer v. Escape Adventures, Inc., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). The only case to

have determined common carrier liability for hot air balloons is Balloons Over the Rainbow, Inc. v. Dir.
of Revenue, decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri. 427 S.W. 3d 815, 827 (Mo. 2013). The Court
held that a hot air balloon operator was not a common carrier because there was no evidence that it
offered itself to the public without limitations and therefore, did not fit within the state’s statutory
definitions. Id.

74.

Nalwa, 290 P.3d at 1166. The Nalwa court recognized Gomez’s broad application when including roller
coaster rides as common carriers but chose to narrow the common carrier definition by interpreting
Gomez as limiting its holding solely to roller coaster attractions. Id. This decision has been criticized for
starting a trend of denying monetary relief to injured plaintiffs. See Year-in-Review, Nalwa v. Cedar
Fair, L.P., 55 Cal. 4th 1148 (2012), 40 W. St. U. L. Rev. 245, 248 (2013).

75. See Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 639.
76. Id. at 635.
77.

Id. at 638.
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consider her common carrier claim since the decision would have significantly impacted
the court’s analysis of Escape’s duty when considering primary assumption of risk.78
In response, the court outlined provisions of the California Civil Codes and
explained that, “while common carriers are not insurers of . . . safety, they are
required ‘to do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under
the circumstances.’”79 The court then compared the Nalwa and Gomez decisions,80
finding that “the key inquiry in the common carrier analysis is whether passengers
expect the transportation to be safe because the operator is reasonably capable of
controlling the risk of injury.”81 The court concluded that a hot air balloon operator
is not a common carrier because balloon pilots have no “direct and precise control
over the speed and direction of the balloon.”82 The court further concluded that
collision risks of hot air balloons cannot be mitigated “without significantly altering
the transportation experience.”83 The court reasoned that requiring balloon operators
to use additional power and steering to avoid collisions would negatively impact the
industry by demanding unreasonable control of a risk that is within the “fundamental
nature” of ballooning.84 Although the court found that Escape had a duty to provide
safety instructions to each participant,85 it held that the primary assumption of risk
defense applied to ballooning86 and ultimately affirmed the lower court’s grant of
summary judgment.87
The court erred on two grounds when holding that hot air balloon operators are
not common carriers. First, the court ignored applicable California precedent that
would have demonstrated that a hot air balloon operator—as the entity controlling the
balloon flight for its passengers—is a common carrier.88 Second, the court should have
78. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 27, at 9.
79. Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 640 (quoting Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d

897, 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).

80. Compare Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1166 (Cal. 2012) (holding that a bumper car operator

is not a common carrier), with Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 51 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a
roller coaster operator is a common carrier).

81.

Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 640–41.

82. Id. at 641–42.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 641.
85. Id. at 644.
86. Id. at 643.
87.

Id. at 648. To reach this conclusion, the court needed to determine whether Escape owed Grotheer any
duty of care whatsoever. Id. at 642. Since crash landings due to limited steering capabilities are an
inherent risk of ballooning, Escape did not have any duty to provide a smooth descent to its passengers.
Id. at 643. This Case Comment does not seek to minimize the validity of the primary assumption of risk
as a secondary legal step to the common carrier analysis.

88. See, e.g., Treadwell v. Whittier, 22 P. 266, 270 (Cal. 1889); McDaniel v. Dowell, 26 Cal. Rptr. 140, 143

(Cal. Ct. App. 1962); McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, 23 Cal. Rptr. 339, 340–41 (Cal. Ct. App.
1962).
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given more weight to Gomez v. Superior Court 89 because the facts in Nalwa v. Cedar
Fair L.P.,90 and similar case law,91 are clearly distinguishable from Grotheer’s case.
First, the court ignored important precedent that would have clearly illustrated
that a hot air balloon operator is a common carrier.92 California courts have held that
a vehicle operator is a common carrier when its passenger has no physical control
over the activity in which he or she is participating.93
In Treadwell v. Whittier, the plaintiff was injured in a hydraulic elevator accident
in the defendant company’s business building.94 The Supreme Court of California
ruled that an elevator is a common carrier and emphasized that elevator operators
should be held to a higher duty of care, reasoning that elevator passengers “are
subjected to great risks to life and limb [when] . . . [t]hey are hoisted vertically, and
are unable, in the case of the breaking of machinery, to help themselves.”95 The court
further held that common carrier “responsibility attaches . . . [when] human beings
submit their bodies to their control by which their lives or limbs are put at hazard.”96
While the court emphasized the importance of using modern machinery and
maintaining safe equipment, the elevator passengers’ inability to exercise control over
their movement or the machinery was clearly a factor in the court’s common carrier
analysis when it determined that “lifting human beings from one level to another”
justified higher duty of care.97
In McDaniel v. Dowell, the plaintiff was knocked over by another skier as she was
reaching for a tow rope on a ski slope.98 The plaintiff argued that the ski tow operator
was a common carrier because the ski tow served as an elevator carrying skiers up the
hill.99 The court concluded that the ski tow rope did not have the characteristics of a
89. 113 P.3d 41 (Cal. 2005).
90. 290 P.3d 1158, 1160–61 (Cal. 2012).
91.

See generally Swigart v. Bruno, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 556, 559–61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); Griffin v. The
Haunted Hotel, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 834–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).

92.

See, e.g., Treadwell, 22 P. at 270 (outlining various modes of transportation that are held to be common
carriers); Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 640–41 (discussing why rollercoasters are considered common
carriers); McDaniel, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 143 (discussing why a ski lift tow rope operator is not a common
carrier); McIntyre, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 340–41 (detailing why a mule rental company is a common carrier).

93.

See Treadwell, 22 P. at 271; but see McDaniel, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 143 (finding that a ski tow rope operator is
not a common carrier because the rope “does not physically carry the plaintiff,” and because of the user’s
active role in the use of the ski tow rope).

94. 22 P. 266, 267 (Cal. 1889).
95. Id. at 271.
96. Id.
97.

Id. Furthermore, the court reached its conclusion by stating that “the care and diligence required is
proportioned to the danger to the persons carried.” Id. Therefore, elevator operations required “a higher
degree of care and diligence.” Id.

98. 26 Cal. Rptr. 140, 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962).
99. Id. at 143.
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common carrier because it “did not physically carry the plaintiff.”100 The court in
McDaniel distinguished a ski tow from an elevator, explaining that as she gripped
the ski tow rope, the plaintiff ’s body was “under her own control,” and she “did not
entrust the carriage of her person to the operator” as she would have when riding in
an elevator.101 A significant factor in the court’s analysis in McDaniel was that, like
the elevator passenger in Treadwell,102 the plaintiff exerted physical control over her
actions in the activity.103
Had the Grotheer court applied the Treadwell and McDaniel courts’ reasoning, it
would have found that Escape was a common carrier.104 Despite any lack of control
that Gallagher may have had over the wind or possible collisions, Grotheer did not
have any independent physical control over the hot air balloon.105 Like the plaintiff
in the elevator in Treadwell,106 Grotheer was entirely in the hands of an operator and
was being “hoisted vertically” by a mode of transportation.107 As Kitchel explained, it
was Gallagher’s responsibility to add more heat during a wind shear.108 Unlike the
ski tow rope in McDaniel that the plaintiff grasped to convey herself up the ski
slope,109 Grotheer’s hot air balloon was controlled by a pilot for a commercial operator
who ultimately had the ability to avoid the collision.110 Thus, the Grotheer court’s
reliance on the presence of wind and collision risks to justify its holding that a hot air
balloon is not a common carrier was incorrect. The key inquiry in the common
carrier analysis should not focus on the operator’s control of the risk of injury, but
rather, on the passengers’ role in the activity and its potential risks.111 Grotheer did
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Treadwell, 22 P. at 271.
103. See McDaniel, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 143. McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables is also instructive. 23 Cal. Rptr.

339, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962). In McIntyre, the court held that a mule train operator was a common
carrier and emphasized that the tour company was responsible for “[exercising] the utmost care” in
organizing its rides since the plaintiff would have no control of the mules chosen or route taken during
the ride. Id. This further demonstrates that California courts seriously consider the amount of control
exerted when analyzing a common carrier issue. Id.

104. Compare Grotheer v. Escape Adventures, Inc., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 640–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017),

with Treadwell, 22 P. at 270, and McDaniel, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 143.

105. See Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636–37.
106. Treadwell, 22 P. at 271.
107. Id.; see also Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 637.
108. See Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 637.
109. McDaniel, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
110. Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 637.
111. Compare id. at 640–42, with Treadwell, 22 P. at 270, and McDaniel, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 143. Furthermore,

following this precedent would have also been consistent with the reasoning in Nalwa v. Cedar Fair,
L.P., which the Grotheer court uses to justify its conclusion. See Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d
1158, 1166 (Cal. 2012); Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 640–41. Although the court characterized Nalwa
as focusing on the operator’s “risk management,” it failed to cite a key factor in Nalwa’s analysis. Grotheer,
222 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 640–41. Nalwa held that a bumper car operator was not a common carrier because
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not have any physical control over the activity112—unlike a bumper car rider,113 or a
skier using a tow rope114 —regardless of whether Gallagher was “reasonably capable
of controlling the risk of ” crash landings.115 Had the Grotheer court considered
precedent that clearly emphasized the participant’s role in the activity, it would have
held that Escape was a common carrier.116
The Grotheer court’s second error was not relying more heavily on Gomez117
because the facts in Nalwa118 and similar cases119 are quite different from the facts of
Grotheer. When applying common carrier law to amusement-related attractions,
courts should use Gomez’s reasoning that the rider “[surrenders] their freedom of
movement and actions”120 to the attraction and thus, has no part in creating their
resulting injury.121
In Griffin v. Haunted Hotel, Inc., the plaintiff participated in a haunted house
attraction “where actors jump[ed] out of dark spaces often inches away from patrons,
holding prop knives, axes, chainsaws, or severed body parts.”122 At the end of the
haunted house’s predetermined path, which was controlled by the operator,123 an
actor frightened the plaintiff, who subsequently ran, fell, and incurred injuries for
which he sued the operator of the attraction.124 A representative of the haunted house
attraction testified that, while the point of the attraction was to scare the guests “as
much as you possibly can,” the plaintiff ultimately “chose to run” in that instance.125
Following Nalwa, and deciding that primary assumption of risk would shield the
any inherent risks of bumping were caused by participants who are “not passively carried or transported
. . . [but are] actively [engaged] in a game,” and thus do “not entrust the operator with his or her safety.”
Nalwa, 290 P.3d at 1166. The Grotheer court did not seem to consider this finding in Nalwa. Grotheer,
222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 640–42.
112. See Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636–38 (finding that plaintiff was a passenger being guided by a pilot).
113. Nalwa, 290 P.3d at 1166.
114. McDaniel, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
115. Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 641.
116. Id. at 641–42.
117. See generally Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41 (Cal. 2005).
118. Nalwa, 290 P.3d at 1166.
119. See generally Swigart v. Bruno, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 556, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that a horseback

riding plaintiff ’s negligence claim was barred by primary assumption of the risk); Griffin v. The Haunted
Hotel, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (granting the jump-scare attraction
defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on a primary assumption of risk theory).

120. Gomez, 113 P.3d at 49.
121. Compare id., with Swigart, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 559, and Griffin, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 847; see also Nalwa,

290 P.3d at 1166.

122. 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
123. See id. at 842.
124. Id. at 834.
125. Id. at 837.
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operator from liability, the Griffin court held that running and falling out of fright is
an inherent risk of visiting a haunted house.126 The court reasoned that these
attractions rely on guests’ active participation, and therefore guests may have a role in
creating their own injuries.127 Griffin implies that frightened guests would still be
responsible for their actions despite being within an operator-controlled attraction.128
Furthermore, the majority of case law has since applied Nalwa in recreational
contexts without consideration of operator-controlled environments, leaving the risk
of injury fully in the participant’s hands.129 For example, in Swigart v. Bruno, the
plaintiff was participating in a horseback riding event when she was struck from
behind by the defendant’s horse.130 Following Nalwa,131 the Swigart court held that
the plaintiff ’s negligence claim was barred because there was an inherent risk of
being struck by a co-participant’s horse.132 In Swigart, an operator was not present,
and horse-riding is an activity that involves active rider participation leaving riders
responsible for their actions.133
Had the Grotheer court properly distinguished its case from Nalwa and similar
precedent relating to amusement-related attractions—both in terms of the type of
ride involved and how this affects the rider’s potential fault in causing their own
injury—it would have followed Gomez in reaching its decision.134 The Grotheer court
improperly followed Nalwa despite indications that it should be limited in application
to cases involving physical activity.135
Grotheer’s holding that balloon operators were not common carriers was centered
on the rationale that hot air balloon pilots cannot adequately control the inherent
risks of wind and collisions.136 However, the Nalwa court’s holding that a bumper car
operator is not a common carrier utilized a rationale more complex than finding that
the activity at issue involved “bumping” risks outside of the operator’s control.137
Nalwa’s reasoning was that a bumper car attraction does not involve being “passively
carried or transported from one place to another,” but entails the participant’s role in
126. Id. at 845, 847.
127. See id. at 847.
128. See id. at 842.
129. See Swigart v. Bruno, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 556, 559, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
130. 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 556, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
131. Id. at 564 n.10 (citing Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1163 (Cal. 2012)).
132. Swigart, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 567.
133. See id.
134. See Broderick v. State, No. F073710, 2018 WL 3032365, at *14–17 (Cal. Ct. App. June 19, 2018) (citing

Nalwa, 290 P.3d at 1156–58) (examining “[w]hether the activity in question is a form of physical
recreation of which each participant assumes the inherent risks”).

135. See generally Swigart, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 559; Griffin, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846; Nalwa, 290 P.3d at

1157.

136. Grotheer v. Escape Adventures, Inc., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
137. Nalwa, 290 P.3d at 1166.
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“actively [engaging] in a game . . . [determining] whether to turn and accelerate.”138
Like a haunted house, an operator “maintains” the ride and has “control over an
emergency switch,”139 for example, but bumper car riders are responsible for driving
the vehicles and thus create any injury through their own actions.140
The rollercoaster in Gomez—unlike the attractions in Nalwa141 and Griffin142—was
found to be a common carrier because the riders were strapped in and were thus
“assured of their actual safety” as they were traveling in a controlled space.143 Other
jurisdictions have also confirmed that passengers “[giving] up . . . freedom of movement
of actions” is a relevant factor in the common carrier analysis in the context of
amusement rides.144 The court in Nalwa even distinguished these different attractions
by using the reasoning of Gomez—while “[a] roller coaster is constrained to a track and
subject to the exclusive control of an operator,” bumper car “riders have control over the
entertainment of the ride” and thus actively participate in creating any injury that may
arise.145 Indeed, Nalwa has rarely been applied to the common carrier issue, which may
indicate that a showing of physical activity or recreation is required.146
The Grotheer court—rather than relying on wind speed and lack of operator
capabilities as key factors to reach its conclusion147—should have placed more
emphasis on Gomez because the hot air balloon experience is far more analogous to a
confined, rollercoaster-type attraction148 than to a bumper car or haunted house.
Passengers in hot air balloons and roller coasters enter vehicles that govern their
physical movements, regardless of inherent risks.149 During the normal course of
operations, there is generally neither reason nor opportunity for passengers of hot air
balloons or roller coasters to cause their own injuries. By focusing the common
carrier analysis on the type of attraction at issue and how the attraction affected
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Griffin v. The Haunted Hotel, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
143. Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 48 (Cal. 2005).
144. Id. at 49 (citing Lewis v. Buckskin Joe’s, Inc., 396 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1964)).
145. Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1166 (Cal. 2012) (citing Gomez, 113 P.3d at 47–48).
146. Outside of Grotheer, Nalwa appears to have only been cited within an explicit common carrier analysis

on one occasion, when a Nevada court addressed a river rafting accident. Sewell v. Capital One Corp.,
No. 3:18-cv-00016-RCJ-CBC, 2019 WL 3754215, at *10 (D. Nev. Aug. 8, 2019).

147. Grotheer v. Escape Adventures, Inc., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
148. Gomez, 113 P.3d at 48. The Gomez court also likened a roller coaster to a “helicopter sightseeing ride” as

a means of transportation and further implied that such sightseeing rides could be held to be common
carriers. Id. at 50–51.

149. See id. at 48–49 (explaining that riders are “assured of their actual safety” and relying on other jurisdictions

to demonstrate the importance of passengers surrendering themselves to the operator). Additionally,
California has found that inherent risk should be irrelevant in the common carrier analysis. See Squaw
Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 901–05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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Grotheer’s participation, the court would have correctly deemed a hot air balloon to
be a common carrier.
Finally, in holding that hot air balloon operators are not common carriers,150
Grotheer has unduly narrowed the traditionally broad definition of common carrier
status in California law.151 This narrowing of the common carrier doctrine prevents
plaintiffs, like Grotheer, from obtaining relief when faced with the primary
assumption of risk defense.152 Excluding hot air balloon operators from common
carrier status goes squarely against the California legislature’s desire for a liberal
interpretation of common carrier law.153
As early as 1932, the Supreme Court of California held that almost any mode of
transportation can be considered a common carrier.154 That court also confirmed
that “there is an unbroken line of authority in California classifying recreational
rides as common carriers.”155 California courts originally created common carrier
status when passengers, situated in enclosed stagecoaches controlled and driven by
an operator, could not create or avoid harm.156 This followed the policy that “human
cargo is the most precious commodity.”157 Considering this historically broad
application and interest in protecting passengers, the Grotheer court erred by holding
that hot air balloon operators are not common carriers. After all, a hot air balloon
tourist is arguably no different than a passenger in a stagecoach, as both travel in an
enclosed vehicle that is controlled by an operator.
Excluding hot air balloons from common carrier status means that the doctrine
of primary assumption of risk would potentially preclude passengers injured during
sightseeing flights, or other similar activities, from recovering damages for those
injuries.158 The Grotheer decision only serves to expand the applicability of primary
assumption risk, which “has been twisted into an all-purpose tool for exculpating
wrongdoers from responsibility for the consequences of their carelessness.”159 The
Grotheer court’s decision allows even the most unscrupulous defendants, who oversaw
150. Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 642.
151. Gomez, 113 P.3d at 45.
152. See Grotheer, 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 639 (explaining the preclusion of the primary assumption of risk

doctrine when common carrier status is granted).

153. Franklin, supra note 20, at 40 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 4 (Deering 2018) (“[P]rovisions are to be

liberally construed with a view to . . . promote justice.”)).

154. Smith v. O’Donnell, 12 P.2d 933, 935 (Cal. 1932) (applying common carrier status to “[s]tage coaches,

busses, automobiles, hackeys . . . sleds, elevators and in fact almost every vehicle which can be employed
for that purpose”).

155. Gomez, 113 P.3d at 45.
156. Paul Mose, Wet n’ Wild: When Water Rides Should be Subject to the Highest Duty of Care, 63 Kan. L. Rev.

787, 831 (2015).

157. Franklin, supra note 20, at 37 (emphasis added).
158. See Withy, supra note 65 (explaining that the primary assumption of risk doctrine is a “complete bar to

the plaintiff ’s recovery”).

159. Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing “Duty”, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 265, 299–300 (2006).
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accidents that could have been managed and avoided by the operators, to utilize this
defense.160
The Grotheer court’s decision to ignore relevant case law, the implications of the
California Supreme Court’s decisions, and historical bases of common carrier liability
will now contribute to the narrowing of opportunities for relief in a once expansive
area of California law.161 The Grotheer court erred in holding that Escape, a hot air
balloon operator, was not a common carrier,162 and should have denied summary
judgment. Unfortunately, even when California precedent and tradition strongly
suggest otherwise,163 California courts may rely on this decision to further limit the
application of common carrier status. Denying application of common carrier status
to attractions akin to rollercoasters and other rides will impair the legal rights of
plaintiffs, like Grotheer, who are injured while seeking enjoyment, entertainment,
and new experiences. While we cannot guarantee a trip to Oz, by reassessing today’s
common carrier law trends, we can help to reassure passengers and tourists that their
participation in these adventures is both protected and encouraged.

160. See Grotheer v. Escape Adventures, Inc., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
161. Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 45 (Cal. 2005).
162. Grotheer, 222 Cal Rptr. 3d at 642.
163. See Webster v. Ebright, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714, 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). The California Supreme Court

has always refused to extend the “rigorous” law applicable to common carriers “to persons who have not
expressly assumed that character, or by their conduct and from the nature of their business justified the
belief on the part of the public that they intended to assume it.” Id.
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